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ABSTRACT 
In transport, the problem of demand exceeding capacity often takes place with congestion as a 
result. The resulting delays imposes substantial efficiency loss. Price discrimination by peak-load 
pricing is a well-recognized way of handling the problem. Such schemes are, however, often 
politically controversial because it might disadvantage vulnerable groups of passengers. An 
alternative is the use of a priority scheme. In this paper, a framework positioned within the 
traditions of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is established to analyse the welfare effects of granting 
one group of passengers’ priority on transport modes characterized by limited capacity and low 
frequency. The case is a trial arrangement initiated at a rural car ferry crossing in Northern 
Norway ensuring that local commuters (traveling to and from work) can board at the desired 
departure. With respect to pricing, it is a stated objective of the road authorities that fares and 
discounts at ferries are equal throughout the nation. Hence, it is neither desirable nor legal for 
local political authorities to ensure local commuters a predictable transport alternative by price 
discrimination. The empirical evidence demonstrates that loss of social welfare caused by 
congestion problems at the port can be potentially reduced by introducing such a priority 
scheme. Recommendations are provided with regard to the required number of users required for 
the priority arrangement to render a positive net benefit for society. This ex ante information is 
useful for policy makers when evaluating whether to initiate such priority schemes to reduce 
efficiency loss in passenger transport markets.    
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Welfare effects, Priority traffic, Scheduled services, Limited capacity, Ferry transport 
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INTRODUCTION 
A particular feature of the demand for transport is that consumers consider the travel time in 
addition to monetary costs. Time has a price because it has alternative uses [1]. With special 
relevance for transport, Bruzelius [2] addressed the welfare economic effects of travel time 
savings. The time value is considered by the generalized transport cost of a trip, which is 
expressed by a single, usually monetary, measure combining most of the important costs that 
form the overall opportunity costs of the trip [3]. Generally, reduced generalized transport costs 
increases the consumer surplus and thereby the social welfare as well. Assessments of 
infrastructure projects indicate that time cost is one of the most important components of the 
generalized transport cost [4]. Therefore, the development of an effective transport system is an 
important transport policy objective in most countries. 
It is commonly accepted that the maximum welfare for the society arises when market 
equilibrium matches the intersection between the demand and supply curves [e.g. 5]. However, 
the basic model assumptions does not capture the particular features of transport service markets 
[e.g. 3]. In addition to the fact that travellers consider the value of travel time in addition to 
money costs, particular characteristics of transport are the indivisibility of supply (limited 
capacity on vehicles), scheduled departures and systematic fluctuations in demand.  
On trips using frequency-based transport modes, such as a bus or a ferry, waiting time can 
make up a large proportion of total travel time and, as such, of their generalized cost. Hence, any 
reduction in waiting time cost will, all else being equal, lead to improved social welfare [6]. 
During peak times, the available capacity is not sufficient to meet demand on scheduled services 
with capacity restrictions such as car ferries. Under these conditions, the increased time costs 
each new vehicle incurs for itself and other vehicles is not considered by each passenger; an 
effect widely discussed in the transport literature and dating back to Mohring [7].  
A well-recognized common measure to handle peak-problems and reduce external effects 
of congestion is by price discrimination [e.g. 8] implying that travellers are charged more during 
peak hours to reduce demand. However, such schemes might reduce the welfare of some groups 
in society who have to travel at particular times (i.e. parents who have to drive their children to 
kindergarten or workers who have to be at work at a fixed time). As a result, peak load pricing 
has distribution effects and could be politically controversial [9].    
As an alternative solution to price discrimination, this article addresses the consequences 
of discriminating groups of users transport according to their valuation of time (VOT). That is, to 
give travellers with high time costs, such as people travelling to and from work (commuters), 
priority to board first. Consequently, total waiting time cost falls and social welfare increases. 
More specifically, the objective of the paper is to develop a theoretical framework for discussing 
the welfare effects of giving one group of passengers’ priority to board first at frequency-based 
transport modes. Using data from the Norwegian ferry industry, the model will be applied to 
estimate the welfare effects of discriminating travellers using that particular mode of transport.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we establish a theoretical model 
framework for discussing the relationship between welfare effects of providing priority to a 
particular group of travellers on frequency-based transport modes. The model is applied in 
Section 3, using empirical data related to a trial arrangement in the Norwegian car ferry industry. 
Finally, conclusions and implications are presented in Section 4. 
 
THE MODEL 
Let us assume that   policy makers will implement a priority scheme on a particular public 
transport route if the measure leads to improved public welfare, i.e., that the benefit to society of 
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introducing such a scheme exceeds the cost. The priority arrangement is relevant solely for peak 
departures with capacity problems. The welfare effect, 𝑊𝑊, of providing commuters priority on a 
particular route is defined in (1). 
 
𝑊𝑊(𝐷𝐷) = 𝐵𝐵(𝐷𝐷)− 𝐶𝐶(𝐷𝐷) where 𝜕𝜕𝐵𝐵 𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷,𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶 𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷 > 0⁄⁄   (1) 
 
In (1), the welfare effect, 𝑊𝑊, of granting boarding priority to commuters depends on the 
number of commuters, 𝐷𝐷, and is the difference between the benefits, 𝐵𝐵, and costs, 𝐶𝐶. It is 
reasonable to assume that both the benefit and the cost will be positively related to the number of 
commuters granted priority on a given route, 𝐷𝐷. The number of commuters comprises persons 
required to use the ferry to travel between home and work. In this model, it is assumed that the 
population of commuters is exogenously given and is influenced by neither the authorities nor 
the transport company. 
A common framework for assessing costs and benefits against each other is the cost-
benefit analysis (CBA). CBA is well suited to evaluate welfare effects of public investment 
projects [e.g. 10] and has been an important tool for evaluating and ranking transport investments 
for several decades [11]. According to the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA) [12], 
the costs and benefits of road infrastructure projects should be discounted over a lifetime of 40-
years using a discount rate of 4%. 
 
Net benefit for travellers 
The net benefit for travellers, 𝐵𝐵, of introducing a priority arrangement is determined by how the 
sum of traveller’s time cost is affected as specified in Equation (2). The benefits in (2) comprise 
three elements including both private and external effects. The first parenthesis from the left 
addresses waiting time savings for allowing commuters with higher VOT to board instead of 
non-commuters with lower VOT. For further discussion on the valuation of waiting time for 
travellers by ferry, we refer to Hanssen [13]. Second, the middle parenthesis includes the 
advantage of being able to disembark first so that the average speed can be increased (do not 
need to overtake buses, tourists, or trucks). This would be of particular importance in a country 
such as Norway where most ferries are located in rural areas in which roads are winding and the 
opportunities to pass other vehicles are rare. Finally, the last parenthesis to the right is an option 
value related to having the opportunity to exercise the priority. This is because public transport is 
also valued for its potential utilization, not only for its actual use [14]. The fact that option values 
may form a potentially relevant benefit category in public transport policy appraisal has been 
established by Geurs et al. [15]: 
 
𝐵𝐵(𝐷𝐷) = ((𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 − 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁) ×𝐻𝐻1 × 𝛼𝛼 × 𝐷𝐷) + (𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 ×𝐻𝐻2 × 𝛼𝛼 × 𝐷𝐷) + (𝛾𝛾 × 𝐷𝐷)     (2) 
 
In (2), 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 and 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁 are valuations per unit of time for commuters and non-commuters, 
respectively. The number of hours (time use) is indicated by 𝐻𝐻1 for waiting time at the port and 
𝐻𝐻2 for reduced travel time from port to destination by being able to disembark first. If such an 
arrangement does not provide the advantage of disembarking first, the value of 𝐻𝐻2 is zero. The 
proportion of commuters boarding when capacity is full, and thereby exercising their priority 
right, is indicated by 𝛼𝛼 being a relative measure ranging from 0 (no users) to 1 (all commuters 
exercise priority option). The parameter 𝛼𝛼 is given by the number of commuters using the 
priority right over the total number of commuters taking part in the arrangement. Hence, the 
number of actual users of the arrangement is (𝛼𝛼 × 𝐷𝐷). Finally, the last parenthesis includes the 
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option value, 𝛾𝛾, related to having the right to priority boarding. The option value has a positive 
pecuniary value (𝛾𝛾 > 0) and is independent of whether the commuter exercise the right 
(independent of 𝛼𝛼).  
Let us address the first element of (2) in more detail. The benefit relates to the fact that 
each time a commuter utilizes the priority right, leaving a non-commuter waiting for the next 
departure, there will be a positive welfare effect because the commuter has a higher willingness 
to pay for reduced waiting time. Hence, the benefit occurs solely if a non-commuter is displaced. 
This difference in time value is not considered by the individuals, and is an external effect related 
to reducing the time value of congestion. By subtracting the waiting time cost of non-commuters (𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁 × 𝐻𝐻1) from the commuters (𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 × 𝐻𝐻1), we find the marginal change in net benefit related to 
waiting time when the number of travellers who use the priority increases by one. International 
time value studies suggest 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 > 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁 [see 16], implying that 𝜕𝜕𝐵𝐵 𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷 > 0⁄ . Since net benefit is 
positive for each commuter, total benefits increases with the number of commuters. Moreover, it 
is clear that 𝜕𝜕(𝜕𝜕𝐵𝐵 𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷)/𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻1 > 0⁄  and 𝜕𝜕(𝜕𝜕𝐵𝐵 𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷)/𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 > 0⁄  so that for a given difference in time 
valuation (𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 − 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁), the benefit increases when waiting time, 𝐻𝐻1, increases and a larger part of 
the commuters makes use of the arrangement, 𝛼𝛼.  
The second element in (2) addresses the benefits of being able to disembark first from the 
ferry when the on-board portion of the trip is completed. This benefit relates to the fact that 
traffic is heavy when all vehicles are released simultaneously upon arrival, and a queue will form 
at a point. This is of particular relevance for low-capacity rural roads, which are frequently found 
in areas where car ferries operate in Norway. Being able to disembark first reduces the need to 
overtake other vehicles, resulting in a higher average speed for the commuter and reduced time 
consumption. This effect can, in principle, be either negative or positive. However, because 
commuters use private cars and have above average high time costs, it is reasonable to expect 
them to meet the speed limit to a larger extent than larger vehicles and tourists. The variable 𝐻𝐻2 
represents time savings for this advantage and the benefits increase with the time value of 
commuters, 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶, and is solely relevant for those who exercise their right to priority boarding, 𝛼𝛼.  
 
Cost elements 
It is reasonable that the administrative cost, 𝐶𝐶, of a priority scheme on a route depends on the 
number of travellers who are granted priority on a given route. The relation between cost (𝐶𝐶) and 
the number of commuters (𝐷𝐷) is defined in Equation (3). Non-administrative costs, such as 
increased time costs for non-commuters by being displaced by commuters are included in the net 
benefit assessment in (2). 
 
𝐶𝐶(𝐷𝐷) = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷 where 𝛽𝛽0,𝛽𝛽1 > 0     (3) 
 
In (3), the cost component 𝛽𝛽0 is independent of the number of commuters traveling the 
route. These fixed implementation costs are imposed on the transport authorities because they 
must inform passengers of the change in regulations on this particular route. Such information 
could be distributed by advertisements in local media and/or by arranging town-hall meetings. 
Moreover, there are start-up costs related to preparing the infrastructure at the terminals. Once 
established, the infrastructure handles all priority boarding; the costs for both construction and 
maintenance are assumed to be independent with respect to the number of users, 𝐷𝐷. At a car ferry 
terminal, for example, there is a need for road signs to clearly indicate that a separate queue-line 
is dedicated for commuter vehicles.  
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The costs varying with the number of commuters is represented by parameter 𝛽𝛽1 in (3). 
These are annual administrative costs of organizing the arrangement. Applications from 
commuters who want to be provided priority must be processed, and lists and access cards for 
people eligible for priority must be maintained. Hence, the cost is independent of whether they 
use the arrangement (𝛼𝛼). According to (3), the marginal increase in costs when 𝐷𝐷 increases by 
one unit is represented by 𝛽𝛽1. Alternative cost specifications could be used, but since the case in 
point requires the same incurred costs for each added commuter taking part in the scheme, it is 
reasonable to assume constant marginal costs. 
 
Welfare effects 
For a priority arrangement to gain welfare effects, it is required that the commuter must replace a 
non-commuter. Hence, there must be at least as many non-commuters as commuters at a given 
departure. This is a reasonable assumption because the priority scheme is in effect only during 
peak hours, i.e. in the morning and afternoon when commuters travel to and from work. 
Although benefits and costs both increase with the number of users, they do not develop 
similarly. This is illustrated in Figure 1 based on equations (2) and (3). According to (2), there 
are no benefits when the number of users is zero (𝐷𝐷 = 0). In this particular case, benefits (curve 
B) are zero, while costs (curve C) has the value 𝛽𝛽0. For the scheme to have the potential to gain 
positive welfare effects, it is a necessary condition that (𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 − 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁)𝐻𝐻1𝛼𝛼 + 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻2𝛼𝛼 + 𝛾𝛾 > 𝛽𝛽1. This 
means that the increasing slope with respect to the number of users of the arrangement is steeper 
for benefits than for costs. This is a reasonable assumption. Moreover, the difference between the 
two slopes will increase if the positive elements of the benefit, such as commuters’ valuation of 
time relative to non-commuters, increases and if costs related to each user are reduced. 
Consequently, the welfare effect will always improve with the number of commuters but will be 
restricted by the capacity of the ferry, 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 . At the extreme, it could be an optimal result from the 
model that all vehicles on departures included in the priority arrangement are commuters.  
Consequently, if the arrangement has few users, the costs will dominate the benefits, and 
the welfare effect will become negative. As the number of users increases, the distance between 
the curves diminishes until they intersect at 𝐷𝐷1 and produce a zero change in welfare. For usage 
above 𝐷𝐷1, the arrangement is profitable from a welfare perspective. Finally, Figure 1 
demonstrates the positive welfare effect of introducing the priority scheme by the distance 
between the two curves when the number of users reaches 𝐷𝐷2.  
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FIGURE 1 Illustration of how benefits and costs develop with respect to the number of 
users.  
 
 
By inserting equations (2) and (3) into (1), we arrive at (4), which enables us to study how the 
welfare effects of introducing a priority scheme depends on the different factors included in the 
model.  
 
𝑊𝑊 = ((𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 − 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁) × 𝐻𝐻1 × 𝛼𝛼 × 𝐷𝐷) + (𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 × 𝐻𝐻2 × 𝛼𝛼 × 𝐷𝐷) + (𝛾𝛾 × 𝐷𝐷) − 𝛽𝛽0 − 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷    (4) 
 
The condition for a project being profitable from a welfare perspective is that 𝑊𝑊 is 
positive. A rephrasing of (4) into (5) expresses the condition for 𝑊𝑊 > 0 with respect to the 
number of users, 𝐷𝐷.  
 
𝑊𝑊 > 0 => 𝐷𝐷 > 𝛽𝛽0(𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶−𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁)𝐻𝐻1𝛼𝛼+𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻2𝛼𝛼+𝛾𝛾−𝛽𝛽1       (5) 
 
The derivatives of 𝐷𝐷 in (5) with respect to 𝛽𝛽0, 𝛽𝛽1 and 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁 are positive, whereas the 
derivative with respect to all other variables are negative. This implies that the number of users 
that is required to make the priority arrangement preferable from a welfare perspective increases 
when:  
 
• the user independent costs increases (the value of 𝛽𝛽0) 
• the user dependent costs increases (the value of 𝛽𝛽1) 
• the time value per hour for commuters decreases (the value of 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶) 
• the time value per hour for non-commuters increases (the value of 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁) 
• the time consumption is reduced (the values of 𝐻𝐻1 and 𝐻𝐻2)  
• the proportion of users exercising the priority right is reduced (the value of 𝛼𝛼) 
• the option value is reduced (the value of 𝛾𝛾) 
Benefits (B) 
Costs (C) 
Users (D) 
B, C 
D1 D2 
β0 
Welfare effect (W) 
DC 
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Consequently, from (5), it is possible to provide an ex ante assessment of whether a 
priority arrangement will render positive welfare effects. Evidently, the assumptions of CBA will 
influence the assessment of welfare. If the discount rate increases, we put less weight on future 
benefits relative to the investment cost at start-up. Hence, the required number of commuters to 
make the project profitable from a welfare perspective increases. Conversely, if we extend the 
time period, the benefits will increase, and the required number of commuters will be reduced.  
 
MODEL RESULTS OBSERVED IN LIGHT OF NORWEGIAN CAR FERRY INDUSTRY 
In 2005, the Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communication initiated a trial arrangement. 
This provided commuters priority to board before other travellers at the ferry crossing between 
the ports at Eidsdal and Linge. The ferry crossing is a link between two of the most visited 
tourist destinations on the Norwegian west coast: Geiranger and Trollstigen.  
The ferry connection has a particularly high volume of traffic in the summer months. In 
July 2005 and July 2006, the number of vehicles remaining at the port when the ferry departed 
attained a total of 16 216 and 11 201, respectively. In addition, more than 40% of all vehicles 
were required to wait at least one departure before they were able to board the ferry in July 2005. 
In July 2006, the proportion was, at approximately 28%, moderately lower. Summer traffic 
(June, July and August), typically comprises approximately 55% of the total annual traffic on this 
particular ferry crossing.   
During the most problematic time of year, certain commuters reported having waited as 
much as two hours per day before being able to board the ferry. This wait was considered a 
serious problem for commuters, particularly those who needed to meet at work or pick up their 
children at kindergarten at a given time. Consequently, the Norwegian Ministry of Transport and 
Communication decided to initiate a trial arrangement where commuters were provided priority 
to board the ferry before other travellers on this ferry crossing. Commuters able to document that 
they work and live on different sides of ferry connection were given the opportunity to apply for 
priority status. In Norway, information on place of settlement and work is available for the 
authorities granting the priority status. However, the necessary data for assessing the truthfulness 
of the information provided by the applicant might not be available in other countries making 
such arrangements more difficult to implement.  
The trial lasted three years and was evaluated by Hanssen and Solvoll [17]. Hanssen and 
Solvoll [17] collected cost data from Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA) 
regulating the ferry crossing and from Møre and Romsdal county, where the priority arrangement 
was organized. The information from NPRA formed the basis for estimating 𝛽𝛽0, whereas data 
from the county related to 𝛽𝛽1.  
Hanssen and Solvoll [17] obtained the travellers valuation of the waiting time by the use 
of a questionnaire. The average willingness-to-pay (WTP) for acquiring a priority card was NOK 
79. This WTP is unrealistically low, indicating that the respondents have chosen to answer 
tactically on this question fearing that their WTP might be used to price the priority card. Hence, 
a decision was made to base the valuation on the reduced waiting time for commuters on the 
officially recommended time values [18]. 
 
The cost and benefit of giving commuters priority 
According to Equation (5), the minimum number of commuters for making the welfare effect of 
providing commuters priority to board first on a particular route depends on the corresponding 
costs and benefits. In the following, we will first address the user independent cost of the 
arrangement, then we look into the user dependent costs. Finally, we address the net user benefit 
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of providing commuters on the ferry service the privilege to board the ferry before other 
travellers.  
 
User independent cost 
The Norwegian Public Roads Administration had the following user independent cost of granting 
commuters priority to board the ferry traveling between the ports of Eidsdal and Linge [17]: 
 
• Preparing the project: 1 man-day. 
• Meet officials from the local municipalities: 2 man-days. 
• Information activities: 1 man-day. 
• Preparing information to commuters: 3 man-days. 
• Road signs at the two ports: 29 000 NOK. 
 
The average cost of labour is 560 NOK per hour (incl. social cost), and each man-day is 
comprised of 7.5 hours. Consequently, the labour cost total 29 400 NOK. In addition, 
considering the cost of 29 000 NOK for the signs, we find a total user independent cost of nearly 
58 500 NOK. All prices are in Norwegian kroner (NOK), year 2015 values. 
 
User dependent cost 
The user dependent cost is related to the production and distributing of the signs each commuter 
must have attached to his or her vehicle to obtain priority at the port. This commuter status is 
reconsidered annually. The cost of producing each sign and mailing it to the commuter is 15 
NOK. In addition, the NPRA used 2 man-days to produce and ship the signs. Using the relevant 
cost of labour, a project lifetime of 40-year and a discount rate of 4%, the present value of the 
user dependent cost totalled 4 255 NOK per commuter. 
 
Net user benefit 
The net user benefit of providing commuters priority to board the ferry prior to other travellers is 
according to Equation (2) composed of three components. The first relates to reduced waiting 
time at the port. The second relates to reduced travel time from port to destination by being able 
to disembark first. The third is an option value related to having the right to priority boarding. 
The priority to board the ferry first provided each commuter an average reduction in 
waiting time at the port of 13 hours and 12 minutes per year. Because the reduction in waiting 
time for commuters is accompanied by a similar increase in waiting time for non-commuters, we 
derive net user benefit from reduced waiting time by subtracting the time cost per hour for non-
commuters (𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁 = 95  NOK/hour) from the time cost of commuters (𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 = 113 NOK/hour). The 
difference in time-cost (𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 − 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁)  amounts to 18 NOK/hour. This equation derives a net annual 
benefit per commuter who exercise their priority right, (𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 − 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁)𝐻𝐻1, of 238 NOK. However, the 
proportion of commuters exercising their priority rights were 50% (i.e. 𝛼𝛼=0.5) [see 17]. Hence, 
the average net user benefit from being able to board the ferry first is 119 NOK for each priority 
card holder (𝐷𝐷).  
Priority card holders might also benefit, as is evident from Equation (2), from being able 
to disembark the ferry first when the on-board portion of the trip is completed. We lack input 
data to estimate correctly benefit. However, the speed limit is 80 km/h, but road standard is low 
so drivers unfamiliar with the area or users of large vehicles will not be able to attain this speed. 
Let us assume that the speed reduction for the latter group amounts to 25%. After about 10 km 
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there is an improvement in road standard enabling private cars to overtake slower vehicles. 
Consequently, drivers will be able to hold an average speed of 80 km/hour instead of 60 km/hour 
when they disembark first. During the 10 km of low standard road after disembarking the ferry, 
drivers will save 2 min and 30 seconds of driving time due to priority disembarking. According 
to [17] each commuter, on average, disembark the ferry first 28.4 times due to holding a priority 
card. Hence, the total saving time is 1 hour and 11 min being valued to 134 NOK (𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻2). 
Evidently, the valuation of time is a question for debate. It is for example argued by Halse and 
Killi [19] that time values for waiting should be elevated above that of driving the car. As 
previously mentioned, the proportion of commuters exercising their priority rights were 50% (i.e. 
𝛼𝛼=0.5). Hence, on average for each priority card holder (𝐷𝐷), the annual net user benefit from 
being able to board the ferry first is 67 NOK. 
The third, and final, element of net user benefit included in Equation (2) relates to the 
priority card holders valuation of having the option of using the card (𝛾𝛾). In the questionnaire, 
the priority card holders stated that they, on average, were willing to pay 79 NOK to keep their 
priority card for another year. This willingness to pay translates, for the purpose of this article, to 
the option value.  
Summing up, travellers net benefit from reduced waiting at the terminal, from being able 
to disembark the ferry first and from the option value translates to a net user benefit per 
commuter of 265 NOK. The discounted value of the net user benefit amounts to 5 238 NOK per 
commuter (𝐷𝐷).  
 
The welfare effects of giving commuters at Eidsdal-Linge priority to board the ferry first 
The parameter values needed to calculate the welfare effects of giving commuters priority to first 
board the ferry between Eidsdal and Linge is presented in Table 1.  
 
 
TABLE 1 Benefits and costs of providing commuters priority on the ferry crossing between 
Eidsdal and Linge 
 Description Value (NOK) 
𝛽𝛽0 User independent start-up costs 58 450 
𝛽𝛽1 Net present value of user dependent costs  4 255 (𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 − 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁)𝐻𝐻1𝛼𝛼 +𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻2𝛼𝛼 + 𝛾𝛾 Net present value of user benefits 5 238 
 
 
When inserting the parameter values from Table 1 into Equation (5), we find that the minimum 
number of commuters required for the project to have a positive welfare effect is 59. Because 40 
commuters on Eidsdal-Linge were provided priority, this particular project had a negative effect 
on welfare. By inserting the parameter values from Table 1 into Equation (4), we find that the 
negative welfare effect from providing commuters on this particular ferry crossing priority to 
board first totalled 19 100 NOK. Moreover, by solving Equation (5) with respect to 𝛽𝛽1 and 
inserting the values for 𝛽𝛽0 and (𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 − 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁)𝐻𝐻1, we find that the user dependent costs per commuter 
must be reduced by 11% to 3 777 NOK for the project to have a positive effect on welfare when 
the number of commuters (𝐷𝐷) equals 40. Another approach is to hold costs fixed and assume that 
the authorities initiate the project if it is profitable, and use their valuation of benefits.  
In Figure 2, the relation between the number of commuters and the benefits and cost of 
granting them priority is illustrated. The two lines labelled Benefit and Cost 1 are based on the 
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parameter values in Table 1. As a basis for the Cost 2 curve, the parameter values from Table 1 
were used with the exception of 𝛽𝛽1, which has been given the value 3 777 NOK.   
It can be observed from Figure 2 that the benefit of the project (line Benefit) and the cost 
of the project when the user dependent cost equals 3 777 NOK (line Cost 2) intersect at 
approximately 40 commuters. In accordance with the principal relations discussed in Figure 1, it 
is evident from Figure 2 how Cost 1 lie above Benefit at 𝐷𝐷 = 40, and that these two lines 
intersect at 𝐷𝐷 ≈ 59. If 𝛼𝛼 > 0.5, the point of intersection would be reduced to lower values of 𝐷𝐷. 
For any given value of 𝐷𝐷, the distance between Benefit and the two cost curves illustrates the 
welfare effect of providing commuters priority. To the left of the intersections, the distance 
between the lines illustrate how negative the welfare effects are at the particular level of 𝐷𝐷. 
Conversely, the distance between Benefit and the cost lines to the right of the intersections 
illustrate how positive the welfare effects are. Thus, it can be observed from Figure 2 that, when 
for example 𝐷𝐷 = 50, there will be a positive welfare effect of approximately 14 600 NOK when 
𝛽𝛽1 = 3 777 (Cost 2 line) and a negative welfare effect of approximately 9 300 NOK, when 𝛽𝛽1 =4 255 (Cost 1 line). 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 The relationship between the number of commuters, net benefits and costs. 
 
 
One of the main objectives of the Norwegian transport policy is to encourage regional 
development [20]. Public subsidies to ferry services in rural areas characterized by fjords and 
islands are among the measures provided to achieve this objective. Hence, the allocation of 
resources to the ferry industry is largely caused by political objectives related to a distribution 
policy. Jørgensen et al. [21] revealed the welfare effect of all state operated ferry crossings and 
concluded that approximately 25% of these contributed negatively to social surplus. Because 
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these ferry crossings remained in operation, Jørgensen et al. [21] suggested that the benefits for 
the users must implicitly be valued higher than that of other parts of the population. In 
accordance with this line of thought, we can conclude how much the benefits of the commuters 
are valued relative to the non-commuters. In the case of the crossing between Eidsdal and Linge, 
where the arrangement is introduced for 40 users, it can be derived that the benefits of 
commuters are valued approximately 23% higher than that of the non-commuters. This value 
follows from the assumption that all users are active (indicating that the value is excessively 
high) and does not include a valuation of disembarking first and does not include the option 
value (indicating that the value is excessively low). Provided the authorities’ goal of distribution 
policy, it could be reasonable to use priority boarding at ferries as a means to encourage working 
people to live in rural areas.  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
In this article, we have developed a model framework for an ex ante assessment of the welfare 
effects of introducing a priority arrangement on a low frequency scheduled transport mode with 
capacity restrictions. Such priority arrangements could be relevant when the implementation of 
price discrimination is not possible or desirable to deal with congestion problems. The model 
indicates how many users are required to make the arrangement beneficial for the society as a 
whole. Based on a set of assumptions, it is demonstrated that the difference between the marginal 
changes in benefits and costs when an additional user is included in the system is decisive.   
The results from the model show that welfare problems (negative external effects) related 
to congestion at the port can be successfully reduced by introducing a priority scheme. 
Consequently, such priority schemes should be considered for scheduled transport services with 
capacity constrains where politicians want to discriminate certain passenger groups and when 
price discrimination is deemed unacceptable. The arrangement becomes more attractive if the: i) 
waiting time (headway) is higher, ii) difference in time value between prioritized group and the 
other increases, iii) marginal costs of serving additional users is low and iv) future benefits are 
valued higher.  
The model is applied on a trial arrangement at a Norwegian ferry crossing where 
commuters are granted priority boarding with the objective of maintaining settlement in rural 
areas. Not all information on benefits were available; therefore, the estimates of benefits can be 
considered conservative estimates. Despite low investment costs, the welfare effect of the case in 
point is negative. The number of commuters participating in the arrangement was 40, whereas 
the required number to produce a positive welfare benefit for the project was 59. Consequently, 
the case in point can be viewed as a failure because it does not contribute positively to social 
welfare. The fact that the priority arrangement continues to be conducted shows that the benefits 
for commuters is valued at least 23% higher by the authorities than that of the non-commuters. 
Given the stated objective of Norwegian transport policy of contributing to regional 
development, this is not an unreasonable conclusion.  
These results relate to commuters at a specific ferry crossing but the approach could as 
well be treated in terms that are more general. For example, other groups of travellers could be 
granted priority on other transport modes. Admittedly, it is a weakness that only linear 
relationships are applied. It should also be noted that implementing such a priority scheme could 
influence the behavior of both commuters and non-commuters. Hence, using average values for 
time cost might not reflect the actual preferences of passengers being displaced. However, as for 
all studies involving time costs it is uncertainty related to determining this value. Nevertheless, 
the conclusions are robust and provide insight into the effects of the mechanisms determining the 
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welfare effects of such projects. Consequently, the model renders a manageable way of assessing 
ex ante whether a priority arrangement has positive welfare effects. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Becker, G., A Theory of the Allocation of Time. The Economic Journal, 1965, 75(299), 
pp. 493-517. 
2. Bruzelius, N., The value of travel time: theory and measurement. Croom Helm, London, 
1979. 
3. Button, K., Transport Economics. 3rd Edition. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2010. 
4. Hensher, D., Measurement of the valuation of travel time savings. Journal of Transport 
Economics and Policy, 2001, 35(1), pp. 71-98. 
5. Pindyck, R.S. and D.L. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, 
NJ, 2001. 
6. Jara-Diaz, S., Allocation and valuation of travel time savings. In Handbook of Transport 
Modelling, D. Hensher and K. Button, Editors. 2008, Elsevier Ltd: Amsterdam. pp. 363-
379. 
7. Mohring, H., Optimization and Scale Economies in Urban Bus Transportation. The 
American Economic Review, 1972, 62(4), pp. 591-604. 
8. Börjesson, M. and I. Kristoffersson, The gothenburg congestion charge. Effects, design 
and politics. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 2015, Vol, 75, pp. 
134-146. 
9. Hensher, D.A. and M.C.J. Bliemer, What type of road pricing scheme might appeal to 
politicians? Viewpoints on the challenge in gaining the citizen and public servant vote by 
staging reform. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 2014, Vol. 61: pp. 
227-237. 
10. Brent, R.J., Handbook of research on cost-benefit analysis, Robert J. Brent, Editor, 2009, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
11. Eliasson, J. and M. Lundberg, Do Cost-Benefit Analyses Influence Transport Investment 
Decisions? Experiences from the Swedish Transport Investment Plan 2010-21. Transport 
Reviews, 2012. 32(1), pp. 29-48. 
12. NPRA, Konsekvensanalyser, Norwegian Public Roads Administration, 2014. 
13. Hanssen, T.-E., The influence of interview location on the value of travel time savings. 
Transportation, 2012, 39(6), pp. 1133-1145. 
14. Roson, R., Social cost pricing when public transport is an option value. Innovation, 2000, 
13(1), pp. 81-94. 
15. Geurs, K., R. Haaijer, and B. Van Wee, Option value of public transport: Methodology 
for measurement and case study for regional rail links in the Netherlands. Transport 
Reviews, 2006, 26(5), pp. 613-643. 
16. Gunn, H.F., An introduction to the valuation of travel time-savings and losses. In 
Handbook of Transport Modelling, D. Hensher and K. Button, Editors. 2008, Elsevier 
Ltd: Amsterdam. pp. 503-517. 
17. Hanssen, T.-E.S. and G. Solvoll, Først ombord og først i land - Evaluering av forkjørsrett 
for pendlere på fergesambandet Eidsdal-Linge. Senter for Innovasjon og 
Bedriftsøkonomi, 2007. 
18. Østli, V., A.H. Halse, and M. Killi, Verdsetting av tid, pålitelighet og komfort tilpasset 
NTM6. Transportøkonomisk institutt, 2015. 
Hanssen, Mathisen   14 
 
19. Halse, A.H. and M. Killi, The value of reliability in economic analysis - theoretical 
foundation, PUSAM. Institute of Transport Economics, 2010. 
20. Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communications, Nasjonal transportplan 2014-
2023, 2013. 
21. Jørgensen, F., T.A. Mathisen, and B. Larsen, Evaluating transport user benefits and social 
surplus in a transport market-The case of the Norwegian ferries. Transport Policy, 2011, 
18(1), pp. 76-84. 
  
 
